The Indonesian constitutional system contains a serious flaw that means that the constitutionality of a large number of laws cannot be determined by any court. Although the jurisdiction for the judicial review of laws is split between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, neither can review the constitutionality of subordinate regulations. This is problematic because in Indonesia the real substance of statutes is often found in implementing regulations, of which there are very many. This paper argues that that is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to remedy this problem. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to laws below the level of statutes. The paper begins with a brief account of how Indonesia came to have a system of judicial constitutional review that is restricted to statutes. It then examines the experience of South Korea's Constitutional Court, a court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws like Indonesia's. Despite controversy, this court has been able to interpret its powers to constitutionally invalidate statutes in such a way as to extend them to subordinate regulations as well. This paper argues that Indonesia's Constitutional Court should follow South Korea's example, in order to prevent the possibility of constitutionalism being subverted by unconstitutional subordinate regulations.
The Gap in Indonesia's Review System
The result of this situation is a gap in Indonesia's system for the judicial review of laws, with no judicial mechanism available to deal with the constitutional review of laws below the level of statute, of which there are very many.
8 There is therefore no way an Indonesian affected by the unconstitutionality of a lower level law can obtain relief, unless the national legislature, the DPR can be persuaded to legislate to overrule the regulation. This would usually not be a realistic alternative to constitutional review because a DPR decision would be based on political reasons rather than legal ones, and, in any case, the DPR is notoriously very slow in working through its legislative agenda.
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The absence of a judicial mechanism for the constitutional review of laws below the level of statute matters a great deal in Indonesia because, as Damien and Hornick have explained, the real substance of any statute is often only to found in its implementing regulations:
[statutes] function more as policy declarations than as statutory schemes. Implementation usually depends on the enactment of subsequent legislation and the promulgation of special implementing regulations. Until such implementing rules are established, the 'basic' law operates mostly as a statement of national intention.
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This problem has become all the more serious since the Constitutional Court in two decisions in 2017 11 struck down provisions allowing the Ministry of Home Affairs to annul enacted Regional Regulations (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) , finding that to do so usurped the power of the judicial branch. These decisions yet further restrict the avenues available for citizens to take action 2018), Chapters 2 and 3. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Simon Butt and Nicholas Parsons, "Judi- As matters stand, if a future government with a majority in the DPR decided to deliberately subvert the Constitutional Court by adopting New Order practice and issuing unconstitutional regulations there is nothing that could be done to repeal them. As will be shown below, this has, in fact, happened at least once in the post-Soeharto era, and that leaves Indonesians vulnerable to the possibility of unconstitutional rule.
In this paper, I argue that it is open to the Constitutional Court to reconsider its position on review of regulations in order to fill the hole in Indonesia's system of constitutional law. It could do so by interpreting its power of judicial review of statutes to extend to cover laws below the level of statutes.
More specifically, I will argue, first, that a split jurisdiction for judicial review,
like that in Indonesia, should not necessarily be seen as a creating two 'siloed' jurisdictions, one for statutes and one for regulations, such that a constitutional court should be excluded from reviewing lower level laws. Second, I will argue that the power to review statutes should always extend by implication to In late 1999, with euphoria over the end of the New Order still in the air, several proposals for judicial review of laws were discussed by the MPR Working The Supreme Court is authorised to decide cases in relation to justice for the citizens, while the Constitutional Court is to guard the laws, to maintain law and order, to harmonise the constitution and all other regulations below the basic law. Therefore, judicial review should be in one court. All the reviews should be conducted by the Constitutional Court. Currently, the Supreme Court has the authority to review regulations below statute … this authority should be moved the Constitutional Court. This Court is the one to maintain the order of laws. Not only below statute, but all laws below the constitution. It seems clear that the resulting situation by which the constitutionality of lower level laws cannot be tested in any Indonesian court was not properly anticipated during the amendment debates. Not only was it not discussed but no one even raised the issue. It seems, in fact, to have been an oversight. This is all the more surprising given the issue had certainly arisen in other countries well before Indonesia began amending its Constitution in 1999, as I show below.
Constitutional Courts and Review of Regulations
As a preliminary point, I emphasise that the power to review subordinate regulations is not an exclusive feature of common law systems, as Ranuwihardjo implied, and as is still sometimes suggested in Indonesia. Certainly, courts of common law countries such as the United States, Australia, and Canada do routinely constitutionally review regulations, and strike them down when they contravene constitutional protections, or otherwise exceed constitutional power.
That is also true, however, for many constitutional courts in civil law countries, for example, Germany, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. In fact, Korea's Constitutional Court -a constitutional court in an Asian civil law country with a split jurisdiction for judicial review of laws -offers an excellent point of comparison in assessing Indonesia's very similar system of judicial review of laws.
The Constitutional Court of Korea
The Constitutional Court of Korea, like the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, is, as mentioned, a specialised constitutional court that sits alongside a Supreme In other words, the power conferred on the Korean Constitutional Court is to review laws or statutes, while the Supreme Court has the power to review laws below that level, that is, administrative decrees, regulations or actions.
Despite these seemingly clear provisions, the Korean Constitutional Court has been able to expand its powers to constitutionally invalidate subordinate regulations. It has done this in two ways. First, it has restrictively interpreted the primary legislation such that it constitutionally invalidates sub-regulations. In other words, it has held that when provisions in a statute are struck down, administrative regulations made under those provisions will now longer have any legal basis and so must necessarily also be void. As well as having compelling legal logic, this position reflects the fact that, as a matter of practicality, many subordinate regulations lose all coherence once terms, definitions, procedures or institutions in the statute they are intended to apply fall away. The requirement of "direct infringement by law" means that the complainant's rights and freedoms are directly infringed by the law itself of which he/she complains, not by any specific executive action taken to implement it. [Even if] a law is expected to be implemented by further administrative action, if the law by itself has directly changed people's legal rights and duties or already determined people's legal status before any specific act has taken place to implement it, thereby irrefutably concluding people's legal rights and duties to the extent that such rights and duties cannot be changed by any further administrative action, the requirement of directness is regarded to be fulfilled.
24
This aspect of the Court's reasoning to justify an implied jurisdiction to review subordinate regulation rests on several bases. Most importantly, it considered that Article 107(2) of the Constitution, properly read, did not exclusively assign the constitutional review of all administrative action (including regulations) to the Supreme Court but only that "at issue in a trial". Because only implemented or enforced regulations could be put at issue in trial, the Supreme Court's constitutional review jurisdiction was not available for persons whose rights had been directly infringed -that is, infringed by the fact of regulation, rather than its implementation or, in other words, infringed in principle. That such persons merited constitutional review and relief was made plain, the Court held, by provision for individual constitutional complaints alleging violations of basic rights.
The Court therefore concluded that constitutional review of administrative action other than action "at issue in trial" must be within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Were Article 107(2) read otherwise, there would be a jurisdictional vacuum, in that there would be no possibility of constitutional review or remedies for individuals whose rights were directly infringed by a subordinate regulation. This is, of course, precisely the problem that has arisen in Indonesia, where the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to determine constitutional rights (but not to review regulations), while the Supreme Court deals with appeals from trials (and has not power of constitutional review), so there is no possibility of constitutional review or remedies for individuals whose rights are directly infringed by subordinate regulation. 
Responses to the Scriveners' Case
As would undoubtedly be the case if a similar decision was made by the 
III. CONCLUSION
There are four conclusions to draw from the experience of the Korean Constitutional Court that are relevant to Indonesia's system of constitutional review. First, while the constitutional review of subordinate regulations is well within the jurisdiction of apex courts with mixed jurisdiction constitutional and appellate jurisdictions, such as Australia, the United States, Canada and, in Asia, Japan, it also not uncommon among specialist constitutional courts. This is true even in systems, including civil law systems, where judicial review is divided between constitutional and generalist courts, as in Germany, Taiwan and Korea.
In fact, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia's failure to review subordinate regulations puts it out of step with some of the most effective constitutional courts in the region, such as those in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan.
Second, the Korean Constitutional Court's view that the power to review a law must necessarily include subordinate regulations issued under that law is a logical and persuasive one. It also has the virtue of preventing a situation arising where a government can pre-empt the consequences of a statute being struck down by simply passing a similar regulation, thus defeating the whole purpose of constitutional review.
In fact, as indicated earlier, something like this has happened before in Third, the example of Korea effectively demonstrates that apparent constitutional barriers to the constitutional review of regulations by the Constitutional Court may be overcome through a principled but pragmatic approach to the interpretation of jurisdictional divisions in the Constitution.
While there are differences between the relevant Korean and Indonesian jurisdictional provisions, the broad outlines of the interpretative approach adopted by the Constitutional Court of Korea may be transferable: a constitutionally split jurisdiction need not be read as creating two exclusive jurisdictions -it could, rather, be seen as dual, bifurcated system, where both courts can review regulations, one against higher level laws and the other against the Constitution.
Instead, the current narrow reading of the jurisdictional split in Indonesia has, as mentioned, created a jurisdictional vacuum that, in important cases, limits the availability to citizens of constitutional review, and thus, constitutional rights. It is open to Indonesia's Constitutional Court to follow the example of Korea's court and fill that hole, by implying a right to constitutionally review regulations, thus providing a remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights are infringed by subordinate regulation. Then, at last, Indonesian courts might be able to 'determine cases' involving regulations 'conformably to the Constitution'
and not be obliged to follow regulations even if they are 'in opposition to the Constitution' , as is currently the case.
Fourth, the example of Korea indicates that although implying a right to review subordinate regulation as inherent in the power to review statutes can be expected to be immediately controversial it may be politically viable in the longer term. In Korea, initial sharp criticisms were not sustained. The Korean case suggests that it is reasonable to expect that the consistent and principled assertion by a Constitutional Court of a broader review jurisdiction that extends to regulations may eventually be complied with, and coalesce into accepted jurisdictional reality.
